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ALD-016        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1552 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  CAROLE L. SCHEIB d/b/a CRAFTON PERSONAL CARE HOME AND 
GEORGE SCHEIB, 
   Debtors 
 
CAROLE L. SCHEIB, 
  Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. Civil No. 2-14-cv-01294) 
District Judge:  Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 16, 2015 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 3, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Carole Scheib, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
  
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania affirming a Bankruptcy Court order 
denying her motion to reopen her bankruptcy case.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
dismiss this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
 In 1997, Scheib filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  The petition was converted 
to Chapter 7 and in 1998, the Bankruptcy Court granted a motion by Mellon Bank, N.A. 
(now The Bank of New York Mellon and BNY Mellon, N.A.) for relief from the 
automatic stay to pursue foreclosure of Scheib’s property in state court.  Scheib received 
a discharge releasing her from her dischargeable debts and her bankruptcy case was 
closed on October 14, 1998.  Scheib was evicted from the property that was the subject of 
the state foreclosure action in 1999.  Scheib has since filed, without success, numerous 
actions in state and federal court seeking to challenge the foreclosure.   
 In 2013, Scheib filed a motion in Bankruptcy Court to reopen her case.  Although 
the motion is far from clear, Scheib appears to allege that she paid her mortgage in full 
and that Mellon Bank committed fraud in the foreclosure action and the bankruptcy 
proceeding.  After a hearing, the Bankruptcy Court ruled that the motion was untimely 
and that Scheib’s challenge to the foreclosure was barred by res judicata and the Rooker-
Feldman1 doctrine.  The Bankruptcy Court also found that Scheib’s filing sought to 
improperly extend its jurisdiction.  The Bankruptcy Court noted that Scheib had been 
                                              
1Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals 
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).  
  
advised in 2000 in an attempted adversary proceeding against Mellon Bank that she must 
pursue issues related to the sale of the property in state court.  The Bankruptcy Court also 
denied Scheib’s motion for reconsideration.   
 Scheib appealed to the District Court, which held that the Bankruptcy Court 
thoroughly and appropriately addressed the motion to reopen.  The District Court also 
denied Scheib’s motion to quash the Bankruptcy Court’s decision denying her in forma 
pauperis status on appeal.  This appeal followed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.  We apply the same standard as the District Court and review 
the Bankruptcy Court’s legal determinations de novo, its factual findings for clear error, 
and its decision whether to reopen for abuse of discretion.  In re Lazy Days’ RV Center 
Inc., 724 F.3d 418, 421 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 We agree with the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that Scheib’s motion to reopen 
was untimely filed.  Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024 incorporates, with 
certain exceptions, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, which sets forth the grounds for 
relief from a final judgment and the time requirements for filing a motion.  Fed. R. Bankr. 
P. 9024; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b),(c).  There is no question that Scheib’s motion to reopen, 
filed more than fourteen years after her bankruptcy case was closed, was not filed within 
a reasonable time as required by Rule 60(c). 
 We also agree with the Bankruptcy Court that Scheib’s motion to reopen 
improperly sought to invoke the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction over issues related to the 
foreclosure of her property, which should have been raised in state court.  As recognized 
  
by the Bankruptcy Court, a bankruptcy case may be reopened “to administer assets, to 
accord the debtor relief, or for other cause.”  11 U.S.C. § 350(b).  We have stated that 
bankruptcy courts should determine whether proceedings are pending in state court and 
which forum – state court or bankruptcy court – is most appropriate to adjudicate issues 
raised by a motion to reopen.  Lazy Days, 724 F.3d at 423.  For example, a motion to 
reopen to determine the scope of the automatic stay would be properly before the 
bankruptcy court because the bankruptcy court is well suited to interpret its own order.  
See id.  In contrast, Scheib seeks to undo the foreclosure and sale of her property long 
ago.  She filed her motion after pursuing relief in state court without success.  Even 
though the state court foreclosure action is no longer pending, the Bankruptcy Court is 
not, under the circumstances of this case, the appropriate forum to seek relief.  The 
Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen.2  
 Finally, to the extent Scheib seeks to appeal the District Court’s denial of her 
motion to quash, we agree with the District Court that the basis of the motion is unclear.  
To the extent Scheib sought to challenge the denial of her request to proceed in forma 
pauperis on appeal to District Court, she provided no basis to disturb the Bankruptcy 
Court’s ruling that her appeal was not taken in good faith.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).  
 Accordingly, we will dismiss this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  
                                              
2Because the motion was properly denied on these grounds, we do not consider the other 
reasons for denying relief discussed in the Bankruptcy Court’s decision. 
